E 'to the shareholders that the legal system places restrictions for the protection and the obligation of reporting financial information that the company must perform.
I draw inspiration from what was written by Elizabeth Corvi on shareholders in his book "Business Communication and Investor Relations" to add some of my considerations.
Shareholders are stakeholders apparently homogeneous and require different information needs. Moving it to their sub, you can find two different classes of interests: the majority shareholders and minority shareholders. To
majority shareholders compete the fundamental role of establishing and implementing business strategies, therefore, they are also responsible for producing most of the business information issued. It follows then that the need for information by the controlling shareholders is almost irrelevant to the political viability of communication, both when the majority shareholders of the company and the leaders do not match (as in the public company, designed as large-cap) is for informational asymmetries that may occur that facilitate the top management of the company, as the majority shareholders, play a special role, they can always request and obtain additional information.
The extraction of the majority shareholders may be financial or industrial nature.
The Minority Shareholders may instead express very different information needs. Even among the minority shareholders can find categories of shareholders, financial or industrial action, but mostly you will find small shareholders or HNWIs.
For this class of shareholders, will be relevant to the investment philosophy, which characterized the distinction between shareholders more or less interested in the affairs of companies (shareholders active and dormant shareholders), and between shareholders with long-term vision (drawers) and shareholder-speculators .
Given that the financial reporting to shareholders, whether majority, minority or to any third party should always be set to greater transparency, when the minority shareholder plays an active role, it is essential by those who control the company, reports set of absolute transparency and honesty in order to obtain not only consent, but cooperation and trust.
Shareholders' d ormienti "(or cassettes) will be more interested in profitability will be limited in time and therefore to receive dividends or be attracted to the Capital Gains achievable by higher values \u200b\u200bof the shares they held over time. When their goal rather than short term they fall into the category of minority shareholders, so-called "speculators" thus manifesting a request for confidential information on corporate developments to exploit opportunities in Borsa nals.
While speculation is useful to provide liquidity to Tit stock oils, excessive speculation can lead to deviant phenomena that can produce negative effects for the company over the long term.
Therefore, while the demand for information from shareholders speculators will not be "interesting" for the company, the information needs of shareholders' sleeping-drawer "should be indulged and satisfied by the establishing a direct relationship with them as this class of shareholders is an important factor of stability in ownership and title. The small shareholders in fact, if properly informed and believe will suit all faithfully business development through the subscription of capital increases, and as operators of the primary market (new issues) and secondary, are, by their conduct, the most significant signal of intrinsic credibility and validity of the listed company.
The financial disclosure requirements that a listed company has been entrusted are therefore primarily intended to inform and protect small shareholders and third parties.
majority shareholders compete the fundamental role of establishing and implementing business strategies, therefore, they are also responsible for producing most of the business information issued. It follows then that the need for information by the controlling shareholders is almost irrelevant to the political viability of communication, both when the majority shareholders of the company and the leaders do not match (as in the public company, designed as large-cap) is for informational asymmetries that may occur that facilitate the top management of the company, as the majority shareholders, play a special role, they can always request and obtain additional information.
The extraction of the majority shareholders may be financial or industrial nature.
- Shareholders Financial are those who fall into the category of institutional investors (investment banking, venture capital, funds, etc). If the shareholders' financial investment policy will be long-term will not create problems of information asymmetry as the objectives of the company and the objectives of its shareholders will tend to coincide as these are aimed at maximizing the value of economic capital. If the investment policy will be rather short period, the shareholder will be seeking as much information as possible.
- are industrial shareholders, who generally through an industrial enterprise as another control group logic.
The Minority Shareholders may instead express very different information needs. Even among the minority shareholders can find categories of shareholders, financial or industrial action, but mostly you will find small shareholders or HNWIs.
For this class of shareholders, will be relevant to the investment philosophy, which characterized the distinction between shareholders more or less interested in the affairs of companies (shareholders active and dormant shareholders), and between shareholders with long-term vision (drawers) and shareholder-speculators .
Given that the financial reporting to shareholders, whether majority, minority or to any third party should always be set to greater transparency, when the minority shareholder plays an active role, it is essential by those who control the company, reports set of absolute transparency and honesty in order to obtain not only consent, but cooperation and trust.
Shareholders' d ormienti "(or cassettes) will be more interested in profitability will be limited in time and therefore to receive dividends or be attracted to the Capital Gains achievable by higher values \u200b\u200bof the shares they held over time. When their goal rather than short term they fall into the category of minority shareholders, so-called "speculators" thus manifesting a request for confidential information on corporate developments to exploit opportunities in Borsa nals.
While speculation is useful to provide liquidity to Tit stock oils, excessive speculation can lead to deviant phenomena that can produce negative effects for the company over the long term.
Therefore, while the demand for information from shareholders speculators will not be "interesting" for the company, the information needs of shareholders' sleeping-drawer "should be indulged and satisfied by the establishing a direct relationship with them as this class of shareholders is an important factor of stability in ownership and title. The small shareholders in fact, if properly informed and believe will suit all faithfully business development through the subscription of capital increases, and as operators of the primary market (new issues) and secondary, are, by their conduct, the most significant signal of intrinsic credibility and validity of the listed company.
The financial disclosure requirements that a listed company has been entrusted are therefore primarily intended to inform and protect small shareholders and third parties.
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